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I. Introduction
For the fourth time, Fortune Magazine named Google the
best company to work for in the United States.1 One can easily
understand why—the benefits are unparalleled. In California, a
day in the life of a “Googler” begins by taking Google’s free
shuttle from San Francisco to the Mountain View campus.2 She
can start the day with a free fitness class before getting a
complimentary cappuccino on the way to the office.3 The company
also provides a concierge service to handle everyday tasks.4 The
concierge can arrange anything from onsite dry cleaning to
haircuts or bike repairs.5 During downtime, an employee can go
bowling at the campus lanes, receive a massage, or take a dance
class.6 All of these benefits are free.7 The company even has
expansive mortality benefits if an employee passes away—each
child of a deceased employee receives $1,000 per month until he
reaches nineteen.8
1. See 100 Best Companies to Work For, FORTUNE (Jan. 3, 2013, 8:43 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/best-companies/?iid=bc_lp_header (last
visited Sept. 24, 2014) (ranking companies based on an extensive employee
survey) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See Kevin Smith, Google Employees Reveal Their Favorite Perks
Working for the Company, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 6, 2013, 11:02 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/google-employee-favorite-perks-2013-3?op=1
(last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (listing a variety of employee reactions to the many
perks that Google offers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Meghan Casserly, Here’s What Happens to Google Employees When
They Die, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2012, 2:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
meghancasserly/2012/08/08/heres-what-happens-to-google-employees-when-theydie/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (discussing Google’s death benefit plan, which
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Most strikingly, however, Google provides unlimited meals
and snacks to its employees.9 While many companies provide food
to their employees in some form, like free coffee and doughnuts
for example, Google and other Silicon Valley tech companies
separate themselves by their meal plans’ level of extravagance.10
Google runs twenty-five cafes at its Mountain View, California
headquarters,11 and serves over 50,000 meals per day at its 120
cafes around the world.12 The meals are lavish—fresh sushi at
Asian-themed Cafe Gia or organic produce from Cafe 150, a
restaurant using only local ingredients found within 150 miles of
Mountain View.13 Google employees even coined the phrase “the
Google fifteen” for the weight gain new employees experience
when they have access to unlimited, gourmet food.14
Although Google does not disclose the financial impact of its
cafe operations, outside estimates suggest a significant
expenditure.15 One source puts the cost around twenty dollars per
also vests all stock and grants fifty percent of the employee’s salary each year to
the employee’s surviving spouse for ten years) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
9. See Smith, supra note 2 (quoting a former employee who stated that
workers are never more than 150 feet away from a cafe or micro kitchen).
10. See Mark Maremont, Silicon Valley’s Mouthwatering Tax Break, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2013, 7:03 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000
1424127887324050304578408461566171752 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014)
(“Although some employers long have been providing free lunches for their
executives or even ordinary workers, Silicon Valley has taken the practice to a
new level.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See J.P. Mangalindan, Google: The King of Perks, FORTUNE (Jan. 30,
2012, 3:18 PM), http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2012/technology/1201/gallery.
best-companies-google-perks.fortune/4.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (stating
that Google increased its number of cafes from eleven to twenty-five) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. Maremont, supra note 10.
13. See Mangalindan, supra note 11 (describing these free food options as
making Google “legendary” for its meal options).
14. See Meghan Keneally, Noisy Massage Chairs, Over-Inflated Egos and
Too Much Free Food, It’s a Hard Life at Google: Employees Take to Web to Gripe
About Their Job Perks, DAILY MAIL (June 19, 2013, 1:23 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2487276/Former-Google-employees-com
plain-job-perks.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (stating that some employees
use corporate gym facilities to prevent the weight gain) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. See Vasanth Sridharan, Google’s Ginormous Free Food Budget: $7,530
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employee each day, which tallies out to approximately $72 million
per year.16 Another source believes Google pays closer to ten
dollars per employee each day.17 Depending on the calculation, it
appears each employee receives between $4,000 to $8,000 in free
food each year.18 Yet Google does not report this benefit as
taxable compensation to its employees.19 Hence, the employees
presumably pay no taxes on this considerable perk.20
Other Silicon Valley companies follow Google’s lead and
provide free meals.21 Facebook has several options for its
employees, including two gourmet cafes in addition to barbeque,
pizza, burrito, and burger restaurants.22 Zynga, the social gaming
tech company, now retains a thirty-three-member culinary staff
that feeds 1,200 employees meals such as chicken vindaloo, beef
tenderloin, and lobster mushroom bisque.23 Some caterers in the
Bay Area call the food boom the “Google Effect,” where even
nontech companies are beginning to offer free food to compete for

Per Googler, $72 Million a Year*, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 23, 2008, 2:36 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/2008/4/googles-ginormous-food-budget-7530per-googler (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (making an estimate about the meal
plan’s cost) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. See id. (admitting that originally this estimate was for Google’s
American operations only but later recalculating and believing that the
worldwide total is close to this number).
17. Maremont, supra note 10.
18. See id. (“Assuming a fair-market value of between $8 and $10 per meal,
a Googler chowing down two squares a day could get dinged for taxes on an
extra $4,000 to $5,000 a year.”); Sridharan, supra note 15 (estimating the cost
per employee at $5,000 to $7,530).
19. See Maremont, supra note 10 (reporting that former Google employees
have said Google does not include meal value on paystubs or W-2 tax
statements).
20. See id. (finding no evidence the employees pay tax).
21. See id. (naming Facebook, Twitter, Zynga, and Yahoo as providers of
free employee meals).
22. See id. (noting that Facebook’s Cafe Epic offers from morning until
night dishes like she-crab soup and grilled steak with chimichurri sauce).
23. See Yukari Iwatani Kane, The Tech World’s Hottest Meal Ticket, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 23, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000
1424052748703886904576031650379762720 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014)
(describing Zynga Culinary as “one of the hottest food scenes” in San Francisco)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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talent.24 One example of the Google Effect is Yahoo!, whose new
Chief Executive Officer Marissa Mayer formerly worked at
Google and brought the free meal practice over to her new
company.25 Mayer even went as far as to say that Yahoo!
instituted a Google-like plan to make it “the absolute best place to
work.”26 Even small startups outside the Bay Area have begun
providing free meals to meet this new industry standard.27 Yet, as
of now, none of these companies or their employees treats the
meal benefit as taxable income.28 In this way, these companies
have effectively created a lavish form of tax-exempt
compensation.29
This practice has sparked debate in the legal community over
whether these meals should constitute taxable income.30 On one
side of the debate, some argue that Google, Facebook, and the
other Silicon Valley companies have these meals for a primarily
compensatory purpose as a means of attracting the best talent.31
24. See Shira Ovide, Work Perk: Free-Meal Rule Widens, WALL ST. J. (July
11, 2012, 6:20 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702
304022004577516912524877338 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (quoting a caterer
stating that free food “has become the norm”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
25. See Maremont, supra note 10 (relaying some of Mayer’s comments
about bringing the food perk to Yahoo!).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Molly Young, The Calorie-Packed Perk, N.Y. TIMES (June 19,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/fashion/the-calorie-packed-perk.html
?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (describing the benefits
arms race for skilled start-up labor in New York) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
28. See, e.g., Maremont, supra note 10 (stating former Google employees
reported not paying taxes on their free meals). Google, other large companies,
and the IRS have declined to comment on the tax status of the food programs.
Id. Theoretically, these companies could pay the taxes for their employees. This
is unlikely because those tax payments would also constitute additional
compensation, and the taxpayer would still need to include it on a tax return.
See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929) (finding tax
payments that a company provided for its officers still constituted income).
29. See, e.g., Maremont, supra note 10 (describing the meals as a
“mouthwatering tax break”).
30. See, e.g., id. (describing lawyers’ disagreement on whether the IRS
should make the companies pay taxes on the meals).
31. See id. (quoting statements of Martin J. McMahon, Jr., a tax law
professor at the University of Florida, who believes the meals represent taxable
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On the other side, some believe that the meals do not have a
primarily compensatory purpose but rather help the employers by
establishing more social interactions that aid innovation and
encourage employees to spend more time at work.32
This Note examines the tax treatment of free employee meals
under programs provided by Google and companies that emulate
its practices, concluding that the fringe benefit is indeed
taxable.33 First, the Note provides a context for fringe-benefit
taxation as a part of gross income.34 Second, the discussion
identifies two relevant exclusions that could potentially apply to
the meals—de minimis fringe benefits and the convenience-ofthe-employer doctrine.35 Third, after sorting through statutes,
regulations, and judicial decisions, this Note argues that the free
meal practices constitute taxable compensation.36 It demonstrates
that the Silicon Valley companies cannot meet the burden of
establishing the meals as de minimis fringe benefits because the
statute specifically mentions eating facilities, the meals occur too
frequently, and accounting for them would not be difficult.37 The
income); Google Mountain View (Global HQ), GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
about/jobs/locations/mountain-view/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (citing both
Cafe Gia and Cafe 150 as “perks” in response to a frequently asked question
entitled “What’s the best thing about working at Google Mountain View?” on a
Google careers page) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
32. See Maremont, supra note 10 (“But these lawyers argue that some
technology firms could qualify, in part because free food encourages longer work
hours and is a crucial part of Silicon Valley’s collaborative culture.”); James B.
Stewart, Looking for a Lesson in Google’s Perks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/16/business/at-google-a-place-to-work-andplay.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (recounting a story
from a Google employee who took a day off yet still came into the office, saying,
“I live in a studio apartment, and I don’t have free food”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. See infra Part V (concluding the current Tax Code requires the
employees to pay taxes on the free meals).
34. See infra notes 45–55 and accompanying text (analyzing the Tax Code
language and subsequent regulations).
35. See infra Part III.A (discussing the applicable standards for de minimis
fringe benefits); Part IV.A–B (discussing the applicable standards for the
convenience-of-the-employer doctrine).
36. See infra Part V (recounting the argument that the meals are taxable
because neither exclusion applies).
37. See infra Part III.B (analyzing these three reasons).
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Note then argues that the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine
does not apply.38 The meals do not serve a “substantial
noncompensatory business reason,” which is required to establish
the exclusion.39 Finally, this evidence will lead to the conclusion
that the current Tax Code does mandate employees pay taxes on
the meals, and that policy reasons should not prevent IRS
enforcement.40
II. Prevailing Legal Framework for Fringe Benefits
To avoid tax liability, the Silicon Valley employees must
prove that an exclusion allows them to leave the free meals out of
their gross income. This Part provides a framework for the
Internal Revenue Code’s treatment of fringe benefits. It
establishes that the Silicon Valley companies provide meals that
constitute gross income unless an applicable exclusion applies.41
The following Parts address two possible exclusions for the free
meals—the de minimis fringe benefit exclusion of § 13242 and the
meals furnished for the convenience-of-the-employer exclusion of
§ 119.43
A. The Expansive Definition of Gross Income
The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution allows the
federal government to collect income taxes “from whatever source
derived.”44 The Amendment engendered the modern federal tax
system by allowing income taxation without apportionment, a
38. See infra Part IV.D (applying the doctrine to the free meal programs).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.119–1(a)(2)(i) (2013); see also infra Part IV.D (asserting
that the employers do not need to provide free meals as a necessary component
of business operations).
40. See infra Part V (concluding with this sentiment and evaluating some
of the policy arguments).
41. See infra notes 66–70 and accompanying text (concluding that the Tax
Code’s expansive base supports this claim).
42. I.R.C. § 132(e) (2012).
43. See id. § 119(a) (providing the statutory framework for the convenienceof-the-employer doctrine).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
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move away from a system based on consumption taxes.45 This
broad power imposes no significant taxation limitations on
Congress but rather grants it the ability to define and narrow
taxable income.46 Subsequently, Congress has echoed the
Sixteenth Amendment by also defining gross income utilizing the
“whatever source derived” language.47 Section 61(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code48 defines gross income and casts a wide
net, listing certain types of income but not limiting the definition
in any way.49 Instead, Congress has used other statutes to
provide specific and deliberate exclusions from this expansive
definition.50 The landmark Supreme Court case Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co.51 reflects this notion.52 The Court strongly
characterized gross income as Congress exerting its full taxing
power, recognizing the “intention of Congress to tax all gains
except those specifically exempted.”53 Accordingly, the Court
ruled that the taxpayers’ awards of punitive damages were gross
income because Congress did not enumerate such an exclusion.54
For the purposes of evaluating the Silicon Valley meal programs,
this background indicates that the tax base is expansive—any
45. See Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, The Sixteenth Amendment, and
the Meaning of “Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1091 (2001) (contending that
the inadequacies of consumption taxes provided the impetus for a federal
income tax).
46. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Psychic Income Revisited: Response to
Professors Johnson and Dodge, 45 TAX. L. REV. 707, 711 n.17 (1990) (stating the
Sixteenth Amendment does not constrain how Congress and the courts may
define taxation).
47. I.R.C. § 61(a).
48. Id.
49. See id. § 61(a)(1)–(15) (providing fifteen categories of potential income).
50. See, e.g., id. § 101 (providing an exclusion for certain death benefits); id.
§ 104 (compensation for injuries and sickness); id. § 130 (scholarships); id. § 132
(certain fringe benefits); id. § 134 (military benefits); id. § 136 (energy
conservation subsidies); id. § 139 (disaster relief payments).
51. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
52. See id. at 428–29 (deciding whether punitive damages fell within the
scope of the 1939 definition of gross income, which is virtually identical to
§ 61(a) for all intents and purposes).
53. Id. at 430.
54. See id. at 431–32 (finding no evidence that Congress intended to
exempt these damages awards).
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income not specifically exempted by statute, or limited by judicial
or administrative interpretations, constitutes taxable income.55
B. Free Meals as Fringe Benefits
As a threshold issue, the free meals plainly constitute gross
income under § 61(a)(1) as a fringe benefit.56 A fringe benefit is
essentially any nonmonetary benefit an employee receives in
connection to the provision of services.57 The examples are
limitless, from a free parking spot to a company car.58 Section 132
of the Internal Revenue Code lists fringe benefits excludable from
taxable income.59 Congress first created this section in 1984,
responding to concerns that the IRS would take new measures to
create nonstatutory fringe benefit exclusions.60 Congress worried
that the Treasury Department’s planned regulations would affect
55. See J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL
INCOME (10th ed. 2012) (describing these types of exemptions as the only limits
to the scope of gross income).
56. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (2012) (“[G]ross income means all income from
whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and
similar items . . . .”).
57. See, e.g., Universal Mar. Serv. Corp. v. Wright, 155 F.3d 311, 320 (4th
Cir. 1998) (“[T]he term ‘fringe benefits’ means those advantages given to an
employee in addition to his regular, monetary pay whose value to the employee
is too speculative to be readily converted into a cash equivalent.”); BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1952 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a fringe benefit as “[a] benefit (other
than direct salary or compensation) received by an employee from an employer,
such as insurance, a company car, or a tuition allowance”); INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., PUBLICATION 15-B: EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO TAX FRINGE BENEFITS 2 (2014),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15b.pdf (“A fringe benefit is a form of pay for the
performance of services.”).
58. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 161-21(a)(2) (2013) (listing examples of
excludable fringe benefits).
59. See I.R.C. § 132 (listing eight current fringe benefit exclusions
specifically envisioned by Congress).
60. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494
(creating § 132, which contained fringe benefit exclusions for no-additional-cost
services, qualified employee discounts, working-condition fringe, and de minimis
fringe); Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, 92 Stat. 996 (barring the
Treasury Department from promulgating new fringe benefit regulations to give
Congress time to legislate).
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some employee benefits that many did not consider taxable
compensation yet leave some valuable benefits untaxed.61 In
introducing the fringe benefits provisions of the Deficit Reduction
Act, Congress sought to balance two considerations. First, it
wanted to protect situations when employers provided their
employees the same goods they sold to the public because those
goods often served more than a compensatory purpose.62 Second,
it wanted to prevent employers from taking advantage of tax-free
benefits by clarifying fringe-benefit taxation.63 Without clear
rules, tax incentives would exist to utilize more noncash
compensation. This practice, in turn, would shrink the tax base
and place a disproportionate tax burden on employees receiving
cash income.64 Congress believed this bill ended the uncertainties
about fringe-benefit taxation, making any fringe benefit that did
not fit within a statutory provision taxable.65 This legislative
history further illustrates that employees should pay tax on
fringe benefits unless a statutory provision directly applies to the
received benefit.
The fringe benefits enjoyed by the Silicon Valley employees
must be analyzed under this statutory framework. Regardless of
how the employer characterizes the free meals, it cannot argue
that daily free meals do not constitute fringe benefits under this
broad definition simply because they are not cash compensation.66
A free meal is a benefit no matter the motivation for providing it,
and most of the Silicon Valley companies characterize it as
such.67 If cups of coffee and personal use of the copier are fringe
61. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-697, at 7–8 (1977) (describing the reasons for the
imposed moratorium on fringe benefit regulations).
62. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, at 286 (1983) (using the example of clothing
store employees wearing the company brand).
63. See id. at 286–87 (expressing the desire to set clear boundaries for taxfree benefits).
64. See id. at 287 (reiterating the goal of eliminating discrimination and
inequities in benefits taxation).
65. See id. at 287–88 (stating that any fringe benefit not a part of the bill or
the Code is taxable under §§ 61 and 83).
66. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1 (2013) (“Gross income includes income realized
in any form, whether in money, property, or services.”).
67. See supra notes 21–29 and accompanying text (describing how
employees use free meals as an enviable perk in recruiting employees).
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benefits, two or three lavish meals per day certainly fit within the
category.68
As a fringe benefit, the taxpayer must include the value of
the free meals in gross income unless a related exclusion
applies.69 In other words, § 61(a) presumptively includes the free
meals as gross income, subjecting the employees to tax liability,
unless the taxpayer can establish that a fringe benefit exclusion
directly applies.70 Of all the possible exclusions, the Silicon Valley
companies could only point to two as possibly relevant—the de
minimis fringe benefit exclusion71 and the meals furnished for the
convenience-of-the-employer exclusion.72 Each of these merits
discussion, but the following analysis will demonstrate that
neither applies to the free meals.73
III. De Minimis Fringe Benefits
A. Statutory Construction of § 132(e)
Of the exclusions listed in § 132, the de minimis fringe
provision is the only relevant exclusion for free meals.74 Neither
the fringe benefits of “no-additional-cost service” nor “qualified
employee discount” applies because each of those provisions
focuses on benefits that do not cost an employer a substantial

68. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e) (providing examples of de minimis fringe
benefits).
69. See id. § 1.61-21(a) (stating that gross income includes fringe benefits
not covered by enumerated exclusions).
70. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012) (including all income as taxable unless an
exclusion applies instead of limiting the types of taxable income to certain
specified categories).
71. Id. § 132(e).
72. See id. § 119(a) (codifying this exclusion).
73. See infra Part III.B (analyzing the de minimis fringe exclusion); infra
Part IV.D (evaluating the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine).
74. See I.R.C. § 132(a) (enumerating eight potential exclusions: “(1) noadditional-cost service, (2) qualified employee discount, (3) working condition
fringe, (4) de minimis fringe, (5) qualified transportation fringe, (6) qualified
moving expense reimbursement, (7) qualified retirement planning services, or
(8) qualified military base realignment and closure fringe”).
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amount of money.75 The “working condition fringe” provision
applies to either business expenses described in § 162 or
depreciation in § 167, both of which are outside the scope of free
meals provided at an employee’s workplace.76 Finally, the other
fringe benefits listed in § 132 are much more specific and do not
relate to employer-provided meals.77 Thus, the exclusion provided
for de minimis fringe benefits under § 132 stands as the only
option even relevant for removing these meals from the tax
base.78
De minimis fringe benefits are defined as “any property or
service the value of which is (after taking into account the
frequency with which similar fringes are provided by the
employer to the employer’s employees) so small as to make
accounting
for
it
unreasonable
or
administratively
impracticable.”79 The Treasury Department provides a few
examples of excludable benefits: personal use of the copying
machine; occasional parties or group meals; holiday gifts of
property; coffee, donuts, and soft drinks; and other similar
incidentals.80 It also provides instances of nonexcludable fringe
75. See id. § 132(b) (mandating that the employer not incur “substantial
additional cost including forgoing revenue” in providing a service to an
employee); id. § 132(c) (requiring any employee discount still have a price either
at employer cost or at no more than twenty percent less than the normal price).
76. See id. § 132(d) (defining working condition fringe benefits); id. § 162
(allowing a deduction for “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business”); id. § 167
(providing a deduction for depreciation of business property).
77. See id. § 132(f) (allowing an exclusion for various transportation
expenses involved in commuting to and from work); id. § 132(g) (providing an
exclusion for employer reimbursement of moving expenses related to work); id.
§ 132(m) (excluding retirement planning advice or information provided by an
employer); id. § 132(n) (relating to military base realignment and closure).
78. But see id. § 132(e)(2)(B) (stating that meals fulfilling § 119 will be
considered de minimis fringe under this provision). The statute states “[f]or
purposes of subparagraph (B), an employee entitled under section 119 to exclude
the value of a meal provided at such facility shall be treated as having paid an
amount for such meal equal to the direct operating costs of the facility
attributable to such meal.” Id. For the purposes of this Note, § 132 and § 119 are
discussed separately, analyzing whether a taxpayer could exclude the meals
under § 132(e) if § 119 did not apply.
79. Id. § 132(e)(1).
80. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132–6(e)(1) (2013) (listing these examples and
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benefits, such as season tickets, country club or gym
memberships, and use of corporate recreation facilities like
hunting lodges or boats.81 Whether a benefit is de minimis often
turns on the frequency with which the employee receives the
benefit.82 A taxpayer must measure the frequency of the benefit
in one of two ways. Primarily, frequency depends on how often an
individual employee receives a particular benefit, rather than
how often the total workforce receives a particular benefit.83 If it
is difficult to determine how much an individual employee
receives a benefit, then the taxpayer can determine frequency
based on how much the employer provides the benefit to the
entire workforce.84 These regulations indicate that receiving a
daily benefit likely does not constitute de minimis fringe.85
Additionally, the Internal Revenue Code includes a provision
about eating facilities in relation to de minimis fringe benefits.86
That provision allows the taxpayer to exclude certain free meals
as de minimis if certain conditions apply: the employer must
receive the meals at a facility on or near the business premises of
the employer and the revenue the employer receives from those
facilities must exceed the costs of operating them.87 This
others that are excludable under I.R.C. § 132).
81. See id. § 1.132–6(e)(2) (listing these examples and others that are not
excludable under I.R.C. § 132).
82. See I.R.C. § 132(e)(1) (2012) (noting that the taxpayers must account for
the frequency they receive the benefit in question when determining that
benefit’s value).
83. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132–6(b)(1) (noting that this “employee-measured”
way of determining frequency does not allow an employee to exclude a benefit
provided infrequently to the entire workforce if he receives that benefit every
day).
84. See id. § 1.132–6(b)(2) (stating the individual frequency is not
important in circumstances when it is difficult to measure).
85. See id. § 1.132–6(b)(1) (“For example, if an employer provides a free
meal in kind to one employee on a daily basis, but not to any other employee,
the value of the meals is not de minimis with respect to that one employee.”).
86. See I.R.C. § 132(e)(2) (defining an instance when meals from certain
eating facilities automatically constitute a de minimis fringe benefit).
87. See id. § 132(e)(2)(A)–(B) (“The operation by an employer of any eating
facility for employees shall be treated as a de minimis fringe if—(A) such facility
is located on or near the business premises of the employer, and (B) revenue [is]
derived from such . . . .”).
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statutory framework provides the standard for determining
whether the meals from the Silicon Valley employers are de
minimis fringe benefits.88
B. The Meals Do Not Constitute De Minimis Fringe Benefits
Under § 132(e)
Based on this legislative framework, the argument that the
free meals are de minimis fringe benefits should fail to persuade
the IRS.89 This argument would contend that accounting for the
free meals would become “unreasonable or administratively
impracticable” for these companies, analogizing the meals to free
coffee or occasional pizza parties in an office.90 This argument is
not persuasive for several reasons. First, the statute itself
actually mentions eating facilities, allowing a de minimis
exclusion if that facility’s revenue “equals or exceeds” its
operating costs.91 Although the statute says “if” instead of “only
if,” this language still implies that the companies cannot exclude
the free meals if they receive no revenue from the cafes and spend
millions of dollars each year to run them.92 The tax exclusion for
these subsidized eating facilities derives from accounting
difficulties.93 Congress did not wish to impose the burden of
recording which employees ate at the facility on particular days
or the costs of the particular meals, as long as the facility
generally profited.94 The Silicon Valley companies could argue
88. See infra Part III.B (applying § 132(e) and asserting that these meals
do not fall within the statutory scope).
89. See § 132(e)(1) (“The term ‘de minimis fringe’ means any property or
service the value of which is (after taking into account the frequency with which
similar fringes are provided by the employer to the employer’s employees) so
small as to make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively
impracticable.”).
90. Id.
91. Id. § 132(e)(2)(B).
92. Id.; see also supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text (describing the
various estimates of Google’s food costs).
93. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, at 299 (1983) (discussing the decision to
include subsidized eating facilities as a de minimis fringe benefit).
94. See id. (evaluating these recordkeeping difficulties but noting that an
employee eating regularly at the facility may not necessarily fit within the
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that they face a similar problem—they would find it difficult to
individually account for the vast quantities of meals, drinks, and
snacks consumed on a daily basis.95 Yet by adopting this
provision, Congress chose to specifically limit the de minimis
fringe benefits to profit-bearing meal facilities rather than free
meal facilities.96 Thus, this eating facility provision in § 132
strongly weighs against the Silicon Valley free meal programs as
constituting de minimis fringe benefits especially when
considering the legislative history.97
Second, even without considering the meal-program
provision, § 132 and its corresponding regulations emphasize that
the frequency with which an employee receives the fringe benefit
dictates whether it remains excludable.98 The de minimis fringe
provisions allow the taxpayer to exclude meals occasionally, not
on a regular or routine basis.99 The regulation explicitly states
that an employee who receives a free meal on a daily basis cannot
exclude those meals.100 Silicon Valley employees not only receive
a meal each day, but often two or even three.101 Based on this

exclusion).
95. See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text (noting the vast quantity
of options for food at Google and other companies).
96. See I.R.C. § 132(e)(2)(B) (2012) (requiring the eating facilities’ revenues
exceed operating costs). Even without this provision, modern food service
technology such as meal cards would seemingly make accounting relatively
easy.
97. See id. (codifying this eating facility provision).
98. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132–6(b)(1)–(2) (2013) (describing how employers
and employees should measure frequency in deciding whether a benefit is de
minimis).
99. See id. § 1.132–6(d)(2) (allowing employer-provided meals on an
occasional basis or for overtime work).
100. See id. (“For example, if an employer provides a free meal in kind to one
employee on a daily basis, but not to any other employee, the value of the meals
is not de minimis . . . .”). The regulation does state that the frequency of the
benefit “is not relevant in some circumstances” when the employer controls the
personal use of the benefit. Id. Personal use of a copier when an employee uses
that copier for business purposes eighty-five percent of the time serves as an
example. Id.
101. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 32 (describing an employee who even
came into the office to eat on her off day).
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frequency provision, de minimis fringe benefits do not apply to
the free meals.102
Third, accounting for the meals does not appear difficult
enough for the IRS to deem “administratively impracticable.”103
In cases which the IRS has discovered that employees excluded
free meals improperly, the employer usually settles with the IRS
and then decides on a fair market per-meal value to withhold
from employee paychecks.104 This withholding practice
demonstrates that these large companies could easily calculate a
flat tax rate for each meal, and that number would not likely
seem “so small as to make accounting for it unreasonable” in the
eyes of the IRS.105
These three reasons refute the possibility of a company such
as Google or Facebook using § 132 to avoid tax liability when
providing free meals.106 The de minimis piece of the Tax Code
focuses on small perks in the workplace like communal soft
drinks or the annual Christmas party, not two or three
extravagant meals each day.107 Companies and firms that do not
provide daily meals yet still serve food to their employees
somewhat often may fit under this exclusion, however.108 For
example, one San Francisco automotive parts manufacturer
provides a catered meal every Friday.109 The Silicon Valley
companies could assert that even if a weekly meal seems
relatively frequent, the IRS’s more liberal stance on § 132 likely
102. See § 1.132–6(b)(1)–(2) (2013) (describing how employers and employees
should measure frequency in deciding whether a benefit is de minimis).
103. I.R.C. § 132(e)(1) (2012).
104. See Maremont, supra note 10 (stating that if the companies do settle
with the IRS, many will increase compensation to cover the employees’ larger
tax burden).
105. § 132(e)(1).
106. See supra notes 92–105 and accompanying text (analyzing these three
reasons).
107. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132–6(e)(1) (2013) (listing examples of acceptable de
minimis fringe benefits, including occasional cocktail parties, picnics, flowers,
low value birthday or holiday gifts, and occasional sporting event tickets).
108. See Ovide, supra note 24 (discussing how a large number of San
Francisco businesses provide free food or similar benefits on a weekly or
monthly basis).
109. See id. (examining San Francisco’s Mission Motor Company).
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results in a business-friendly interpretation and a lack of
enforcement.110 To reiterate, however, no interpretation of § 132
would allow multiple daily meals and snacks, as their frequency
and extravagance exceeds the scope of de minimis fringe
benefits.111 Even assuming a weekly meal constitutes de minimis
fringe benefits, the statutory language explicitly prohibits daily
meals.112 Thus, § 132 does not serve as a shield for Google,
Facebook, and the other meal-providing companies.113
IV. Convenience-of-the-Employer Doctrine
If § 132 provides no exclusion, the Silicon Valley companies
have to rely on the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine. That
doctrine provides an exclusion if the company-provided meals
primarily serve the employer’s business rather than the
employee.114 This Part discusses the history of the doctrine, its
current form in § 119, and relevant cases before arguing that the
Silicon Valley companies cannot use it as a valid exclusion for the
free meal programs.
A. The Development of the Convenience-of-the-Employer Doctrine
The convenience-of-the-employer doctrine existed well before
its 1954 codification in § 119 of the Internal Revenue Code.115
110. See IRS Letter Emphasizes the Liberal Tax Treatment of De Minimis
Fringe Benefits, 34 PENS. & BEN. WK. NEWSL. no. 34 (Research Inst. of America),
Aug. 25, 2008 (evaluating an IRS letter that emphasized the Code does not
specify a dollar limit on de minimis fringe benefits).
111. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text (describing the free meal
plans at some Silicon Valley companies).
112. See Treas Reg. § 1.132–6(d)(2) (“For example, if an employer provides a
free meal in kind to one employee on a daily basis . . . the value of the meals is
not de minimis . . . .”).
113. See Maremont, supra note 10 (listing some of these companies).
114. See, e.g., Heyward v. Comm’r, 36 T.C. 739, 743 (1961) (finding that the
Senate reports indicate this is an appropriate phrasing of the rule), aff’d, 301
F.2d 307 (4th Cir. 1962).
115. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Comm’r, 11 B.T.A. 855, 856 (1928) (applying the
doctrine to taxes collected in 1921); see also 1919-1 C.B. 71 (US), 1919 WL 49990
(representing the first mention of “convenience of the employer” in a treasury
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Before that codification, courts applied two different standards—
the “employer-characterization” and “business-necessity” tests.116
The employer-characterization test essentially turned on whether
an employer intended free meals or lodging to form part of an
employee’s compensation.117 Courts and the Treasury
Department often looked to the accounting practices of the
employer to make this distinction.118 This relatively low bar
allowed the employer to decide whether free meals and housing
constituted taxable income.119 Conversely, the business-necessity
test represented a larger obstacle for employees seeking to
exclude meals and lodging from their income.120 This test asked
whether the benefit conferred serves as a necessary component to
“the functioning of the employer’s business.”121 Reasoning that
any free benefits would convenience the employee, judges applied
this test to require the employer’s needs to form the primary
reason for providing free meals and lodging.122 These contrasting
tests created different outcomes for virtually identical cases.123 As
decision).
116. See Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 85–86 (1977) (comparing the two
different doctrines).
117. See id. (describing various decisions that reflect this test).
118. Compare Doran v. Comm’r, 21 T.C. 374, 376 (1953) (determining that
the statute characterized state employee’s salary as base pay plus rental
allowance, so that rental allowance was taxable income), with 1920-2 C.B. 90
(US), 1920 WL 49099 (deciding “supper money” fell within the convenience-ofthe-employer exception because it was not “additional compensation and not
being charged to the salary account”).
119. See Mary Louise Fellows & Lily Kahng, Costly Mistakes: Undertaxed
Business Owners and Overtaxed Workers, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329, 373 (2013)
(stating that “the doctrine foreshadowed the extreme deference to business
owners”).
120. See Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 88–89 (discussing Tax Court cases rejecting
the idea that “would make tax consequences turn on the intent of the
employer”).
121. Id. at 86.
122. See Benaglia v. Comm’r, 36 B.T.A. 838, 839 (1937) (finding a hotel
employee could exclude his housing “because he could not otherwise perform the
services required of him” without living on the premises); Van Rosen v. Comm’r,
17 T.C. 834, 838 (1951) (determining income was excludable when “the ends of
the employer’s business dominated and controlled”).
123. Compare Doran, 21 T.C. at 376 (applying employer-characterization
test to determine a university employee could not exclude his school-provided
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a result, the Supreme Court admitted that the precodification
doctrine was “not a tidy one.”124 When Congress decided to
revamp the Internal Revenue Code in 1954, the new § 119 sought
to “end the confusion as to the tax status of meals and lodging
furnished an employee by his employer.”125
The legislative history of that codification demonstrates how
Congress
implemented
the
convenience-of-the-employer
doctrine.126 The House seemed to favor eliminating the
convenience-of-the-employer test altogether.127 It proposed to
allow exclusion of meals if the employer required the employee to
eat on the premises.128 This broadly shaped exclusion completely
avoided the compensation issue and instead would have allowed
the employer to decide whether it would impose such a
requirement.129 The Senate modified the House’s provisions,
finding them too ambiguous.130 It decided to formally codify the
convenience-of-the-employer
doctrine,
adding
that
the
compensatory nature of benefits does not solely determine tax
treatment.131 This decision constituted a “major revision” in the
lodging), with Diamond v. Sturr, 221 F.2d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1955) (applying the
business-necessity doctrine to allow a psychiatrist at a mental institution to
exclude his housing and meals from his income).
124. Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 84 (1977).
125. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 18 (1954).
126. See Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 90–91 (“[T]he House and Senate initially
differed on the significance that should be given the convenience-of-theemployer doctrine for the purposes of § 119.”).
127. See id. at 91 (“[T]he House view apparently . . . required complete
disregard of the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine.”).
128. See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 18 (“[T]hese meals and lodging are to be
excluded from employee’s income if they are furnished at the place of
employment and the employee is required to accept them at the place of
employment as a condition of his employment.”).
129. See id. (rejecting a previous test that determined “the value of meals
and lodging are includible in the employee’s income, even where they are
furnished for the convenience of the employer, if there is an indication that the
meals and lodging were taken into account in establishing the salary paid”).
130. See S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 18 (1954) (finding the House provisions
“ambiguous” because they failed to analyze the compensatory nature of
benefits).
131. See id. (“[T]he basic test of exclusion is to be whether the meals or
lodging are furnished primarily for the employer (and thus excludable) or
whether they were primarily for the convenience of the employee (and therefore
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prevailing tax treatment, resulting in the first iteration of
§ 119.132
B. The Modern Standard of the Doctrine Under § 119
The 1954 statute established only two requirements for
excluding meals—the employer must provide the meal for the
“convenience of the employer” and the meal must be provided “on
the business premises of the employer.”133 The Supreme Court
first analyzed this framework in Commissioner v. Kowalski,134 a
decision that serves as the most important judicial interpretation
of § 119.135 The Court in Kowalski addressed the tax treatment of
state-provided meal allowances for the New Jersey State
Police.136 The State provided the officers bi-weekly cash payments
for meals, and allowed those officers to eat wherever they wanted
without providing any accounting.137 The Court sought to
determine whether § 119 allowed officers to exclude that money
from their incomes.138 Relying on precodification case law, New
Jersey argued that the meal money did not constitute
compensation because the allowance merely replaced a failed
meal station program that allowed troopers to eat while still on
taxable).”); JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, SUMMARY OF THE NEW
PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, at 13 (1955) (stating that
the Senate intended to “specifically nullify the ‘indication of compensation’
rule”).
132. Albert A. Gordon, The “Convenience of the Employer” Exclusion and the
Partner-Employee: A New Look, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 779, 781 (1968).
133. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 106
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
134. 434 U.S. 77 (1977).
135. See, e.g., So There Was a Free Lunch After All: CA-9 Reverses Boyd
Gaming, 90 J. TAX’N 324 at *1 (1999) (describing Kowalski as a “benchmark
Supreme Court decision”).
136. See Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 79–82 (describing the meal allowances at
issue).
137. See id. at 80–81 (noting that the troopers received the same allowance,
paid bi-weekly, whether or not they were on patrol, and the State required no
proof that the troopers used the money for their lunches).
138. See id. at 78 (stating the issue presented was whether the allowances
were includable in gross income under § 61(a) and, if so, otherwise excludable
under § 119).
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duty.139 The Court held that the 1954 statute did not allow a
taxpayer to exclude cash payments under the convenience-of-theemployer doctrine.140 It reasoned that even if New Jersey
provided the cash allowances for its convenience, they did not fit
within § 119 because they were not actual meals.141 Furthermore,
even if §119 allowed cash allowances for food, the Court found
that the meal allowances did not seem necessary for an officer to
“properly perform his duties.”142
Kowalski is important because the Court reiterated that
§ 119 replaced prior law and the precodification notion of the
doctrine.143 Without that case law, § 119 could not allow the
exclusion because the officers received cash for meals instead of
the actual meals.144 Additionally, the Court determined that the
new statute followed the business-necessity test.145 It adopted the
“properly perform his duties” language,146 and in doing so
explicitly rejected the employee characterization doctrine.147
139. See id. at 83 (relying on “lower-court cases and administrative rulings”
that determined payments for the convenience of the employer were not
compensatory).
140. See id. at 94–95 (rejecting New Jersey’s argument that § 119’s
legislative history indicated that Congress desired to exclude cash
reimbursements).
141. See id. at 84 (“By its terms, § 119 covers meals furnished by the
employer and not cash reimbursements for meals.”).
142. Id. at 95.
143. See id. at 93 (noting that the codification “comprehensively modified the
prior law, both expanding and contracting the exclusion”).
144. See id. at 84 (determining cash reimbursements did not constitute
meals under § 119).
145. See id. (determining that Congress followed the rationale behind Van
Rosen v. Comm’r in adopting § 119); Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d
1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The Court examined the history of section 119 and
concluded that the ‘convenience of the employer’ should be measured according
to a ‘business-necessity’ theory.”); supra notes 114–23 and accompanying text
(comparing precodification cases).
146. Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 95 (1977).
147. See id. at 92 (“The language of § 119 quite plainly rejects the reasoning
behind rulings . . . which rest on the employer’s characterization of the nature of
a payment.”). Some scholars believe that in practice, the employercharacterization view still prevails in contradiction to Kowalski. See Fellows &
Kahng, supra note 119, at 375 (“It is clear that the ‘convenience-of-the-employer’
requirement has returned to the deferential standard Congress had turned
away from when it enacted I.R.C. § 119.”). This Note discusses this contention
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Kowalski conveyed that an employer must affirmatively
demonstrate that it provides free meals for a business purpose
rather than merely relying on whether the employer accounts for
the meals as compensation.148
Two amendments to § 119 after Kowalski warrant
mentioning for the purpose of applying the statute to the Silicon
Valley companies. First, in 1978, Congress determined that the
ability of an employee to accept or decline meals does not
implicate the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine.149 Second, a
1998 amendment clarified situations in which only some
employees of a company claimed the convenience-of-the-employer
exclusion.150 If at least half of the meals provided to employees
are for the convenience of the employer, then for tax purposes, all
of the meals on the premises are for the convenience of the
employer.151 Thus, the modern version of the statute maintains
the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine but provides little
guidance for its application, requiring considerable emphasis on
the particular circumstances of each case.152
The Treasury Department has promulgated a series of
regulations to interpret and enforce § 119.153 The regulations
as it relates to the practices of the Silicon Valley companies. See infra notes
246–48 and accompanying text (arguing that these companies would have to
apply the employer-characterization test to establish an exclusion).
148. See Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 86 (rejecting “an exclusion from income based
solely on an employer’s characterization of a payment as noncompensatory”).
149. See Act of October 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, 92 Stat. 996 (codified at
I.R.C. § 119(b)(2) (2012)) (“In determining whether meals are furnished for the
convenience of the employer, the fact that a charge is made for such meals, and
the fact that the employee may accept or decline such meals, shall not be taken
into account.”).
150. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (“All meals furnished on the business
premises . . . shall be treated as furnished for the convenience of the employer
if . . . more than half of the employees to whom such meals are furnished on
such premises are furnished such meals for the convenience of the employer.”).
151. Id.
152. See Jane Zhao, Note, Nights on the Museum: Should Free Housing
Provided to Museum Directors Also Be Tax-Free?, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 427, 436
(2012) (“[T]he characterization of employer-provided meals or housing varies
significantly with the facts of each case.”).
153. See Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1 (2013) (clarifying the language and meaning
found in § 119).
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reiterate that the convenience-of-the-employer test requires
“analysis of all the facts and circumstances in each case,” but the
Department’s interpretation identifies a variety of common
factors to consider.154 The regulations echo the business-necessity
test by requiring a “substantial noncompensatory business reason
of the employer” to exclude free meals from the taxpayer’s
income.155 Nevertheless, the regulations maintain that meals may
have a compensatory purpose as long as this “business reason”
still exists.156
Several qualifications that fulfill this requirement are
relevant. First, employees that must remain on call for
emergencies fulfill this requirement.157 Second, employees may
exclude meals provided on account of an employer-required
shorter meal period because employees would not have time to
eat elsewhere.158 Third, circumstances could prevent the
employee from securing a meal within a proper time, such as an
employer located in a remote location.159 The regulations also
note that providing meals “to promote the morale or goodwill of
the employee, or to attract prospective employees” does not
adequately
fulfill
this
“substantial
business
reason”
requirement.160 Finally, the Treasury Department provides
several relevant examples of situations in which an employee can

154. Id. § 1.119-1(a)(1); see also id. § 1.119-1(a)(2) (listing various
considerations for meals furnished without a charge).
155. Id. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(i).
156. See id. (“[I]f the employer furnishes meals to his employee for a
substantial noncompensatory business reason, the meals so furnished will be
regarded as furnished for the convenience of the employer, even though such
meals are also furnished for a compensatory reason.”).
157. See id. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(ii)(a) (“[I]t must be shown that emergencies have
actually occurred, or can reasonably be expected to occur, in the employer’s
business which have resulted, or will result, in the employer calling on the
employee to perform his job during his meal period.”).
158. See id. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(ii)(b) (“[M]eals are furnished to the employee
during his working hours because the employer’s business is such that the
employee must be restricted to a short meal period . . . .”).
159. See id. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(ii)(c) (“[T]he meals are furnished to the employee
during his working hours because the employee could not otherwise secure
proper meals within a reasonable meal period.”).
160. Id. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(iii).
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appropriately exclude meals:161 bank tellers who must limit
lunches to thirty minutes;162 an employee at a state institution
required to remain on duty at all times;163 a construction
employee at a remote job site;164 and a hospital that provides a
free cafeteria to keep employees on call but that does not require
employees to remain on premises.165 However, the regulations say
that a remote company that allows an employee to either
purchase a meal on-site or bring a meal to work does not fulfill
the standard.166 None of the examples directly addresses the issue
here.
Aside from these regulations, the IRS has issued limited
other guidance on the matter. Most of the Agency’s statements
about § 119 concern more traditional and obvious applications of
the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine—they have allowed
exclusions for airline flight crew members,167 hospital
employees,168 and church staff.169 No ruling or memorandum has
applied directly to the free meals at issue here, except for an
advice memorandum on certain investment bank employees.170
That memorandum was particularly strict, requesting a clear
showing of necessary shorter meal periods and emergency
situations along with forbidding any free meals other than those
in the lunch period.171 Although relevant, that memorandum
161. Id. § 1.119-1(f)(1)–(9).
162. Id. § 1.119-1(f)(3).
163. Id. § 1.119-1(f)(5).
164. Id. § 1.119-1(f)(7).
165. Id. § 1.119-1(f)(9).
166. Id. § 1.119-1(f)(8).
167. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advisory 201151020, 2011 WL 6464323 (Aug.
31, 2011) (finding that the requirement that crew remain on airplanes during
meal periods served as a noncompensatory business reason).
168. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-38-142 (June 27, 1980) (allowing exclusion
for employees in remote hospital whose lunch periods were restricted to thirty
minutes for emergency-availability reasons).
169. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-29-037 (Apr. 23, 1991) (allowing exclusion
for church ministers and staff because they needed to be available around-theclock for prayer and support).
170. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory, 2002 WL 1315674 (advising on free
meals supplied by a bank that conducted private banking and securities
transactions.)
171. See id. (listing these requirements and requesting the bank provide
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relied on a later-overturned case, so its persuasive value is
admittedly limited.172 Accordingly, other case law must
supplement this lack of IRS guidance.
C. The Role of Business Judgment
As discussed, the passage of § 119 explicitly rejected the
employer-characterization test in favor of the business-necessity
doctrine.173 The employer-characterization model focused on
whether the employer intended the meals as primarily
compensation or for a necessary business purpose.174 Even if this
approach is no longer law, the convenience-of-the-employer
doctrine still incorporates a business judgment aspect. The
following cases from the Ninth Circuit indicate how courts
consider a company’s reasoning for providing free meals or
lodging to its employees when applying § 119.175
First, Caratan v. Commissioner176 involved § 119’s
application to farm employees.177 Caratan required its
supervisory and management personnel to reside on the farm for
around-the-clock management decisions, so it provided lodging
free of charge.178 The lower court held that the taxpayers had not
proved that the provided lodging “was indispensable to the proper
more evidence about its meal practices).
172. See Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-445 (Sept. 30,
1997), rev’d, 177 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 1999) (deciding casino employees were not
entitled to exclude meals under § 119).
173. See Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 85–86 (1977) (comparing the two
doctrines); supra notes 122–48 and accompanying text (discussing the history of
§ 119 and the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine).
174. See Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 85–86 (describing the employercharacterization test’s intent component).
175. See infra Part IV.C (discussing cases that assert that courts respect a
company’s judgment that free meals are necessary if provided with legitimate
reasoning).
176. 442 F.2d 606 (1971).
177. See id. at 607 (describing M. Caratan, Inc. as a farming operation that
primarily sold grapes).
178. See id. at 607–08 (providing testimony that some farming practices,
such as irrigation, occurred twenty-four hours per day, which necessitated a
supervisor’s presence both day and night).
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discharge of their employment duties.”179 The Ninth Circuit
rejected this evaluation, holding that the taxpayers could exclude
the lodging because it was a condition of their employment under
§ 119.180 The court reasoned that no evidence had contradicted
the taxpayers’ contention that they could not simply live near the
farm, so the lower court erred in deciding that the farm could
possibly operate differently.181 Caratan counsels that no court can
form a business judgment about the necessity of providing free
food or lodging when all evidence supports the opposite
conclusion.182 Thus, this case indicates that § 119 allows the
taxpayer to exclude free meals or lodging if the employer provides
suitable evidence that the benefit is necessary to its business
operations.183
Additionally, Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Commissioner184 follows
Caratan and provides relevant legal analysis.185 In Boyd Gaming,
a hotel required its employees to remain at the hotel and receive
free meals in the cafeteria, pointing to certain unique aspects of
the casino industry.186 The dispute concerned application of the
“substantial noncompensatory business reason” test provided in
179. Caratan v. Comm’r, 52 T.C. 960, 963 (1969).
180. See Caratan, 442 F.2d at 611 (reasoning that the taxpayers met their
burden of proof).
181. See id. at 609–10 (discussing that the lower court did not weigh
evidence but rather substituted its own judgment about farming operations).
182. See id. at 610 (determining the lower court’s conclusions constituted a
business judgment separate from all the evidence provided by the taxpayers’
witnesses).
183. See id. (rejecting the possible availability of feasible alternative housing
as contradicting the farm’s business judgment).
184. 177 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 1999).
185. See id. at 1097 (“This case involves the question whether there really is
a ‘free lunch.’”). This case concerns § 119 in a roundabout way. If meals from an
on-premises facility are for the convenience of the employer, they constitute a de
minimis fringe benefit under I.R.C. § 132(e) (2012). If a de minimis benefit, they
are exempt from the deduction limits that I.R.C. § 274(n) provides for business
meals. This case began when Congress lowered the deduction limit from one
hundred percent to eighty percent. Id. Nevertheless, the case focuses on the
convenience-of-the-employer doctrine as the key issue. See id. (noting the case
originated from the Tax Court’s rejection of Boyd’s § 119 claim).
186. See id. at 1097–98 (listing concerns relating to security, efficiency,
emergencies, and lack of close alternatives).

FIVE-STAR EXCLUSION

2103

Treasury Regulation § 1.119–1(a)(2)(i).187 To meet this test, the
hotel argued that it required the employees to remain on business
premises for reasons the regulations contemplated, such as
availability for emergencies, short meal periods, and food service
responsibilities.188 The lower court asserted that the regulations
for § 119 required a “business nexus,” meaning that the employee
must accept the meal as part of his employment duties or job
description.189 The Ninth Circuit rejected this notion, however.190
It decided that the hotel’s stay-on-premises requirement fulfilled
§ 119 and Kowalski, which required no additional business
nexus.191 As discussed, Kowalski required convenience-of-theemployer meals to relate to an employee properly performing his
duties.192 Boyd Gaming says that these duties refer to an
employee doing the tasks his or her job requires, rather than
referring to a job that innately requires consuming food during
it.193 The court reasoned that the meals must not relate to the
employees’ specific duties in a strict sense, as the lower court
held, or else the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine would only
apply to “restaurant critics and dieticians.”194 Instead, Boyd fit
within § 119 because it provided legitimate business reasons for
requiring its employees to remain on the premises to perform

187. Id. at 1099; see also supra notes 153–66 and accompanying text
(discussing the applicable treasury regulations corresponding to I.R.C. § 119).
188. See Boyd Gaming, 177 F.3d at 1100 (describing the arguments the Tax
Court rejected before the appeal).
189. See Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1997-445, 1997 WL
599594, at *18 (Sep. 30, 1997) (finding that the meals were not necessary to
allow the employees to perform their jobs properly).
190. See Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999)
(asserting that the Tax Court misinterpreted § 119 and Kowalski with its
“substantial business reason” analysis).
191. See id. at 1101 (“Contrary to the Tax Court’s conclusion, no nexus other
than the ‘stay-on-premises’ policy was required for the meals to satisfy the
Kowalski test.”).
192. See Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 95 (1977) (adopting the businessnecessity test); supra notes 145–48 and accompanying text (analyzing
Kowalski).
193. See Boyd Gaming, 177 F.3d at 1101 (finding that the test would rarely
be satisfied if it required an employee’s specific duties relate to consuming food).
194. Id.
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their jobs.195 The court explained, “[c]aptive employees had no
choice but to eat on the premises.”196
Thus, Boyd Gaming stands for three relevant propositions.
First, providing free meals because employees must remain on
business premises for legitimate reasons adequately meets the
convenience-of-the-employer doctrine.197 Second, § 119 does not
require free meals to directly relate to the performance of an
employee’s “specific” duties to constitute legitimate business
reasons.198 Third, courts will respect a company’s business
judgment about these legitimate reasons if they do not merely
constitute a sham.199 This component of the case directly relates
to the Silicon Valley companies, especially because the IRS
acquiesced in the Ninth Circuit’s decision.200 Quoting Boyd
Gaming, the IRS indicated it would take a middle course
regarding the appropriateness of an employer-furnished meal
policy: it will “not attempt to substitute its judgment for the
business decisions of an employer,” yet it would not allow an
employer “to wave a ‘magic wand’” and simply declare its policies
qualified under § 119.201 This guidance counsels businesses to
create a meals policy deriving from actual business needs and
follow that policy to allow tax exclusion.202
195. See id. at 1097–98 (accepting the hotel’s judgment that it needed
employees on-site for security and emergency demands).
196. Id. at 1101.
197. See id. (determining that the casino had explained a reasonable need to
keep employees from traveling off-premises for meals).
198. See id. (noting that a business nexus is not required).
199. See id. (demonstrating that a court should give some credence to the
business decisions of employers).
200. See Announcement 99-77, 1999–32 I.R.B. 243 at *1 (making the
recommendation of acquiescence to the Boyd Gaming decision).
201. See id. (quoting Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d 1096, 1101
(9th Cir. 1999)).
202. See id. (“Thus, the Service will consider whether the policies decided
upon by the employer are reasonably related to the needs of the employer’s
business (apart from a desire to provide additional compensation to its
employees) and whether these policies are in fact followed in the actual conduct
of the business.”). Some scholars note that this IRS statement requires less of an
explanation for prohibiting or restricting employees from leaving for lunch but a
clear showing that this prohibition or restriction actually occurs. See MARTIN J.
MCMAHON & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS
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When considering whether an employer provides meals for a
substantial business reason, Caratan and Boyd Gaming advise
that the employer’s bona fide business judgment provides the
basis for the decision rather than a court’s.203 In other words,
§ 119 will protect the company that makes a rational decision
about providing free meals or lodging for business needs.204 This
business judgment component serves as an important piece of
analysis when considering the Silicon Valley meal practices.205
D. The Meals Fail the Convenience-of-the-Employer Test Under
§ 119
All available evidence suggests that the Silicon Valley meals
are not for the convenience of the employer within the meaning of
§ 119, so the employees do have tax liability. To reiterate the
applicable standard, the employer must provide meals for a
“substantial noncompensatory business reason” on the business
premises.206 As the regulations and cases on § 119 demonstrate,
this analysis depends on the factual circumstances of each benefit
program.207 This subpart first argues that the companies fulfill
none of the enumerated business reasons in the regulations, and

¶ 8.08 (2d ed. 2013) (“It appears from this statement that the IRS will not
question an employer’s judgment in prohibiting or restricting the employees’
ability to leave the business premises for meals, . . . but it will demand that the
employer actually prohibit or restrict employees from leaving the business
premises . . . .”).
203. See Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999)
(finding it inappropriate to second-guess decisions about the casino business);
Caratan v. Comm’r, 442 F.2d 606, 610 (1969) (counseling against using a court’s
decisions about the farming business over the employer’s business experience).
204. See Boyd Gaming, 177 F.3d at 1101 (requiring the employer to support
its policies with legitimate business reasons).
205. See infra notes 232–36 and accompanying text (discerning whether
legitimate reasons support the Silicon Valley companies’ business judgment).
206. See Treas. Reg. § 1.119–1(a)(1) (2013); supra Part IV.A (describing the
statutory framework of the convenience-of-the-employer test).
207. See id. (“The question of whether meals are furnished for the
convenience of the employer is one of fact to be determined by analysis of all the
facts and circumstances in each case.”).
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it asserts that the companies’ potential explanations also do not
constitute substantial business reasons.208
1. The Regulations Provide No Business Reasons for the Free
Meals
To exclude the meals, the taxpayer has the burden of finding
clear statutory language to justify an exclusion.209 The free meal
programs do not meet this standard. Although the statute does
not explicitly define “convenience of the employer,”210 the
corresponding regulations provide enough guidance to
demonstrate that the Silicon Valley employees should pay taxes
on the free meals.211 The companies must provide a reason for the
free meals aside from boosting employee morale or recruiting the
best employees.212 The Silicon Valley companies immediately face
an uphill battle, however, because they cannot point to any of the
frequent noncompensatory business reasons found in the
regulations.213 Two of these enumerated reasons deserve analysis.
208. See infra Part IV.D.1 (discussing that the regulations provide no
enumerated business reason to which the Silicon Valley Companies can
analogize their meal practices); infra Part IV.D.2 (finding the alternative
business reasons do not satisfy § 119).
209. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (2012) (listing fringe benefits as a part of
gross income); Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955)
(describing Congress’s intention to tax all income unless a specific exemption
applies); supra Part II.A–B (providing the background for gross income and
fringe benefit taxation).
210. See I.R.C. § 119(a) (establishing an exclusion for meals provided for the
convenience of the employer but not defining it).
211. See Treas. Reg. § 1.119–1 (providing extensive definitions and examples
for what constitutes substantial business reasons for providing meals to
employees).
212. See id. § 1.119–1(2)(iii) (“Meals will be regarded as furnished for a
compensatory business reason of the employer when the meals are furnished to
the employee to promote the morale or goodwill of the employee, or to attract
prospective employees.”).
213. See id. § 1.119–1(2(ii) (listing six categories of frequently cited
noncompensatory business reasons that can be summarized as follows:
emergency duties; necessarily-shortened lunch periods; remote jobsites;
restaurant employment; reason exists for most employees; missed meal during
working hours); supra notes 154–66 and accompanying text (discussing the
regulation’s substantial business reason requirement).
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First, the taxpayer could argue that the “short meal period”
reason in § 1.119–1(a)(iii)(b) applies because the meals save
time compared to leaving the premises.214 That provision is not
that broad: it requires that “the employee must be restricted to
a short meal period” because of the nature of the employer’s
business.215 The regulations use a position such as a bank teller
as an example, where banks require thirty-minute lunches
because peak business occurs during the traditional lunch
break.216 The Silicon Valley companies are not analogous.
Although the employees may enjoy saving time using the onpremises facilities, the nature of the tech industry does not
require shorter meal periods nor do the employers impose time
limits.217 Google’s encouragement of on-the-job bowling and
massages underscores this point.218 Additionally, many of the
meals are consumed either before or after the workday,219 so
they generally do not fall within the scope of this time-saving
category nor the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine.220 Thus,
214. See id. § 1.119–1(a)(iii)(b) (stating that the need for employees to have a
shorter meal period is a substantial noncompensatory business reason).
215. Id. § 1.119–1(a)(iii)(b).
216. See id. § 1.119–1(f)(3) (allowing bank tellers with this restricted lunch
period to exclude on-premises meals provided by the employer).
217. See, e.g., Karyn Johnson, Perks at Work: Unconventional Benefits Can
Attract
and
Keep
Employees,
NWJOBS
(Sept.
23,
2011),
http://blog.nwjobs.com/careercenter/perks_at_work_unconventional_benefits_ca
n_attract_and_keep_employees.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (stating that
the employees of one tech company would do CrossFit exercises during their
lunch breaks) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
218. See Smith, supra note 2 (describing the different leisure activities
available to Google’s employees during the workday).
219. See, e.g., id. (quoting a former Google employee who stated he would eat
a free breakfast before starting work and remain late to eat a free dinner);
Kane, supra note 23 (describing the happy hour and dinner service at Zynga,
which presumably many employees would attend after completing their work
for the day).
220. See Treas. Reg. § 1.119–1(a)(2) (2013) (“Generally, meals furnished
before or after the working hours of the employee will not be regarded as
furnished for the convenience of the employer.”). But see id. § 1.119–1(2)(ii)(d)
(providing an exception to this general rule for restaurant employees); id.
§ 1.119–1(2)(ii)(f) (allowing the exclusion to apply when duties during normal
working hours prevented the employee from obtaining a meal with a substantial
noncompensatory business reason).
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this time-restriction category does not apply to the Silicon
Valley companies unless they provide a business need for
shortened meal periods other than the desire to simply save
time.221
Second, the only other enumerated reason would contend
that the employees cannot travel off-premises to obtain another
meal in a reasonable time under § 1.119–1(2)(ii)(c).222 Usually,
this provision applies in situations when work occurs in remote
locations without available alternatives to purchase meals.223
For tech companies located directly in San Francisco or New
York, this regulation does not apply because those cities have
almost limitless food options.224 Google and Facebook do have
their headquarters a considerable distance outside of San
Francisco in Mountain View and Menlo Park, respectively.225
These towns, however, still have a variety of restaurants within
close proximity to the business campuses, which employees

221. See id. § 1.119–1(2)(ii)(b) (stating this category does not apply when an
employer limits a lunch break to allow the employee to finish work earlier in the
day).
222. See id. § 1.119–1(2)(ii)(c) (“Meals will be regarded as furnished for a
substantial noncompensatory business reason of the employer when the meals
are furnished to the employee during his working hours because the employee
could not otherwise secure proper meals within a reasonable meal period.”).
223. See, e.g., Wilhelm v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 16, 21 (D. Wyo. 1966)
(finding that feeding employees was indispensable for the ranch business
because the nearest town was twenty-four miles away); Stone v. Comm’r, 32
T.C. 1021, 1024–25 (1959) (applying doctrine to tunnel construction site forty
miles away from nearest town).
224. See, e.g., Robin Wilkey, San Francisco Restaurants Outnumber Every
City in America, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 2, 2012, 6:05 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/02/san-francisco-restaurants_n_1735
091.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (stating that San Francisco has the most
restaurants per capita in the United States at 39.3 restaurants per ten
thousand households, with New York City having the fourth most) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
225. See Google Locations, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/company/
facts/locations/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (providing the address to the
company’s Mountain View, CA headquarters) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Facebook HQ, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pages/
Facebook-HQ/166793820034304 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (providing the
address to Facebook’s Menlo Park, CA headquarters) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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could easily travel to within a lunch hour.226 In fact, even local
restaurants complain that the free meal programs have cost
them considerable business from Google employees, which
illustrates that those employees had several nearby options
before the free meal program’s genesis.227 Thus, at least
regarding their corporate headquarters, Google and Facebook
cannot fulfill the convenience-of-the-employer test because of a
lack of alternative restaurant options for their employees.
2. The Companies Can Provide No Alternative Business Needs to
Satisfy § 119
If the Silicon Valley companies cannot point to one of the
business reasons enumerated in the regulations, they would have
to provide alternative reasons that conform to § 119. Their
argument would rely on Boyd Gaming by asserting its reasons for
the policies and asking the IRS to respect the business judgment
behind those reasons.228 In Boyd Gaming, the taxpayer provided
a list of business ideas behind its requirement to keep employees
on the premises, all relating to the nature of the casino
industry.229 To provide a similar list, the Silicon Valley companies
would necessarily cite reasons related to productivity and the
work environment. They could contend their practices increase
output because the free meals keep employees at work for longer
226. See, e.g., Michelle Mills, 4 Local Restaurants Officially Certified for
Delivering Authentic Neapolitan Pizza, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB. (Mar. 6, 2014,
12:53 PM), http://www.sgvtribune.com/lifestyle/20140306/4-local-restaurantsofficially-certified-for-delivering-authentic-neapolitan-pizza (last visited Sept.
24, 2014) (listing local pizza restaurants) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
227. See Daniel Ebolt, Can’t Compete with Free Eats, MOUNTAIN VIEW VOICE
(July 11, 2013, 11:44 AM), http://www.mv-voice.com/news/2013/07/11/cantcompete-with-free-eats (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (describing how Mountain
View restaurant owners lost the majority of their business when Google began
providing free meals) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
228. See Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999)
(stating that a court should not substitute its business judgment when
evaluating the decisions of a company).
229. See id. at 1097–98 (listing concerns relating to security, efficiency,
emergencies, and lack of close alternatives).
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hours; the open cafeterias encourage collaboration and
interaction; and the meals improve employee health and
energy.230 This argument fails for two reasons.
First, the employees do not require the meals to properly
perform their jobs at the Silicon Valley companies.231 The modern
version of the doctrine derives from the “business-necessity” test,
which asks whether the employer needed to provide meals for its
business to function.232 Virtually every case applying the
doctrine—deciding whether an employer had a “substantial
noncompensatory business reason” for furnishing free meals or
lodging—has focused on whether the meals or lodging were a
condition precedent to business operations.233 In other words,
courts have interpreted the noncompensatory business reason as
those that correlate to accomplishing an essential component—
“business needs” rather than “business wants.”234 For the Silicon
Valley companies, providing free meals to employees does not
satisfy this requirement because they do not need the meals to
“properly perform their duties.”235 No part of developing software
or producing code requires unlimited steak or sushi at lunch.236
These companies can provide meals to make their employees
230. See Maremont, supra note 10 (describing a few of these arguments).
231. See Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 95 (1977) (requiring meals and
lodging be provided to an employee “to properly perform his duties” to satisfy
the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine).
232. See id. at 86–88 (describing the business-necessity test); supra notes
134–48 and accompanying text (analyzing Kowalski and its interpretation of
§ 119).
233. Treas. Reg. § 1.119–1(a)(2); see, e.g., Boyd Gaming, 177 F.3d. at 1097–
98 (deciding that the employer needed its employees to stay on-premises during
work hours because of the nature of the casino business); Caratan v. Comm’r,
442 F.2d 606, 609 (9th Cir. 1971) (determining that providing meals and lodging
to employees was indispensable to the proper functioning of the farm); Jacob v.
United States, 493 F.2d 1294, 1298 (3d Cir. 1974) (finding that a director’s
around-the-clock availability for emergencies at an institute for the mentally
handicapped was a substantial noncompensatory business reason).
234. See, e.g., supra notes 156–66 and accompanying text (listing regulations
that provide acceptable noncompensatory business reasons that allow an
employer to provide free meals).
235. Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 95.
236. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text (providing examples of
the lavish meals provided to employees).
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comfortable and happy with the hope they produce better results,
but in no way is it essential to operations. Additionally, the
companies do not require the employees to eat the meals or
restrict them to the business premises, and these employees could
perform their jobs by bringing their lunches or leaving for an
outside lunch.237 The meals do not relate to employment duties
but rather only enhance the employment itself.238 Accepting this
“increased productivity and collaboration” argument would
extend the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine to a scope wholly
unsupported by fifty years of statutory interpretation and would
reject the legislative intent behind § 119.239 The nature of the Tax
Code does not allow such significant departures from its
boundaries, but rather would require Treasury Department
regulation or congressional action to broaden the exclusion.240
Until such action occurs, the Silicon Valley companies cannot
demonstrate
their
practices
derive
from
substantial
noncompensatory business reasons.
Second, all outward evidence indicates that these Silicon
Valley companies mainly provide these meals as compensation—
a way to compete for the best talent and keep morale high.241
Congress defined § 119 to ask whether meals or lodging are
furnished primarily for the convenience of the employer (and
excludable) or the employee (and subsequently taxable).242 Even
237. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.119–1(f)(8) (stating that meals sold by a company
cafeteria were not for the convenience of the employer even when no outside
eating facilities were available because the employee could bring his own lunch).
238. See Comm’r v. Moran, 236 F.2d 595, 597–98 (8th Cir. 1956) (discussing
the convenience-of-the-employer rule as implicating meals and lodging provided
“as a necessary incident of the proper performance of [an employee’s] duty”);
S.S. Kresge Co. v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. Mich. 1963) (“To
come within the ‘convenience of the employer rule’, it is essential that the
employee be required to accept the meals to properly perform his duties.”).
239. See supra notes 167–72 and accompanying text (providing IRS
decisions applying § 119).
240. See supra notes 57–64 and accompanying text (describing congressional
apprehension at creating extra-statutory exclusions that depart from the
Internal Revenue Code).
241. See Treas. Reg. § 1.119–1(a)(2)(iii) (2013) (stating that meals furnished
to promote morale or attract prospective employees are considered a
compensatory business reason).
242. See S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 18 (1954) (stating the appropriate test as

2112

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2077 (2014)

if increasing time spent at work did constitute a
noncompensatory business reason, the free meal programs do not
serve this purpose primarily. Instead, the free meals primarily
benefit the employee, and the companies market them
accordingly: Google lists the free meals as “perks” in response to a
FAQ entitled “What’s the best thing about working at Google
Mountain View?” on a Google careers page;243 Zynga provides free
food as a “perk to keep employees happy and healthy;”244 Yahoo!
began a free meal program at Marissa Mayer’s command to
compete for talent.245 The characterization that these meal
programs derive from noncompensatory business reasons
constitutes “wav[ing] a magic wand” and forming a sham tax
shelter.246 Accepting this justification would represent a return to
the employer-characterization test that § 119 specifically
eliminated.247 Instead, the objective circumstances demonstrate
compensatory motives.248 For these reasons, the free meals are
not for the convenience-of-the-employer as § 119 requires.
V. Conclusion
The companies have the burden of establishing that an
exclusion applies for their employees to avoid tax liability.249 The
whether the meals were furnished primarily for the employer or rather for the
employee).
243. GOOGLE MOUNTAIN VIEW (GLOBAL HQ), http://www.google.com/about/
jobs/locations/mountain-view/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
244. Kane, supra note 23.
245. See Maremont, supra note 10 (relaying some of Mayer’s comments
about bringing Google’s perk to Yahoo!).
246. Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999).
247. See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text (discussing how § 119
adopted the business necessity test rather than employer characterization).
248. See Treas. Reg. § 1.119–1(a)(2)(i) (2013) (“[T]he mere declaration that
meals are furnished for a noncompensatory business reason is not sufficient to
prove that meals are furnished for the convenience of the employer, but such
determination will be based upon an examination of all the surrounding facts
and circumstances.”).
249. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955)
(reiterating that it is the “intention of Congress to tax all gains except those
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preceding analysis demonstrates that neither § 132(e) nor § 119
applies to the free meal programs offered by Google, Facebook,
and the other Silicon Valley companies.250
Even if the statutory language clearly requires employees to
pay tax on the meals, some proponents believe that policy reasons
justify not paying tax. They argue that free meals encourage
increased interaction and collaboration between employees.251
Others say that the free food contributes to an environment that
maximizes employee comfort.252 Regardless of the policy
reasoning behind these benefits, the Tax Code remains clear
about the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine. No exclusion
applies, so the free meals constitute gross income. Additionally,
different policy reasoning also justifies assessing taxes on the
meals. Tax-free compensation for these tech companies creates
market inefficiency, allowing employees in the tech sector to
receive more compensation than similarly situated employees in
another sector. This creates an inequitable advantage for tech
companies over others, especially for recruiting talent. In creating
the Tax Code, Congress specifically attempted to correct this type
of imbalance to avoid burdening one type of employer over
another.253
If the Silicon Valley companies deserve this type of tax
advantage, Congress should specifically create it. As of now, the
Tax Code mandates that the employees pay taxes on the free
meals. If they believe the meals are important, the employers
could increase cash compensation to those employees in a
proportionate amount to reflect this increased tax liability. With
the growing practice of providing free meals to companies, it is
specifically exempted”); supra notes 44–59 and accompanying text (discussing
gross income and exclusions under the Tax Code).
250. See supra Part III.B (applying § 132(e)’s de minimis fringe benefit
exclusion to the free meals); supra Part IV.D (applying the convenience-of-theemployer doctrine under § 119).
251. See, e.g., Maremont, supra note 10 (quoting Colorado Professor Victor
Fleischer as arguing against the aggressive enforcement of tax laws against
Silicon Valley companies).
252. See Young, supra note 27 (quoting a head recruiter who believes the
lavish perks pay off in employee productivity).
253. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, at 286 (1983) (describing the goal of creating
equitable fringe benefit taxation).
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important that the IRS takes a clear stand. Indeed, the IRS
recently stated that it aims to release guidance on employerprovided meals at some point in 2015.254 This Note seeks to begin
a conversation about these practices to further develop equitable
application of the Tax Code.

254. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2014-2015 PRIORITY GUIDANCE PLAN 7
(2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2014-2015_pgp_initial.pdf.

